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1 Introduction
In the United States, state laws govern residential mortgage defaults and house fore-
closure process. In most states, mortgage loans are recourse loans, that is, lenders can
apply the di¤erence between mortgage balance and proceeds from foreclosure sales to
debtorsother assets or earnings, a process also known as deciency judgments.1 Theory
predicts that recourse should deter default since default puts debtorsother assets at
risk (Ambrose, Buttimer, and Capone 1997, and Corbae and Quintin 2010). Empiri-
cally, however, the ndings have been mixed. For instance, Clauretie (1987) nds that
whether a state allows for deciency judgments does not a¤ect mortgage default rates
signicantly, consistent with the observation that deciency judgments are not carried
out much in practice, if at all, due to the high cost associated with pursuing deciency
judgments (Capone 1996, Leland 2008, and Brueggeman and Fisher 2011).2 By con-
trast, Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) nd lower default rates in recourse states, particularly
for higher-priced homes whose owners are likely to have other nancial resources that
can be seized by mortgage lenders. Many policy discussions have also centered on this
provision. The most prominent is the recommendation by Feldstein (2008) that turn-
ing nonrecourse mortgage loans into recourse loans maybe an e¤ective way to solve the
mortgage debt overhang problem and, thus, the current mortgage crisis.3
In this paper we show that the current debate on deciency judgements as useful
tools to curb mortgage defaults is incomplete and perhaps even misleading. The reason
is because lenders and borrowers respond to changes in regulations. With deciency
judgements, lenders may decide to lend to riskier borrowers, lend more, and/or lend
at lower interest rates. Borrowers may decide not to apply for mortgages or apply for
smaller mortgages. Analysis of the default behavior of approved mortgage loans is, thus,
subject to selection bias. For example, a nding that borrowers are less likely to default
in states with deciency judgements may simply reect the fact that approved borrowers
in those states are less risky.
To illustrate the point, we conduct a unique event study using proprietary mortgage
loan level application and performance data. In 2009, Nevada, one of the crisis states,
passed a legislature that made signicant changes to its deciency judgment law. For
homeowners who enter into a mortgage in conjunction with a purchase of a single family
1There are some exceptions, such as purchase money mortgages in California and 1-4 family resi-
dences in North Dakota. Some states also limit deciencies if a creditor proceeds through a non-judicial
foreclosure. See Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) table 1 for a summary of di¤erent state recourse laws.
2It is costly and time consuming to persue deciency judgments on foreclosures. Additionally, debtors
can le for bankruptcy and get rid of the unsecured deciency debt.
3This suggestion has been controversial as summarized in Adam Levitins blog at
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/12/the-role-of-rec.html
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primary home after October 1, 2009, their mortgage lenders will not be able to pursue
a deciency judgment if the house is taken in a foreclosure. We test whether lenders
respond to the law change by altering their mortgage approval rates, mortgage loan
sizes, and interest rates, and whether borrowers change their mortgage applications by
applying for more and larger loans. To facilitate the comparison with the aforementioned
literature, we also test whether this new legislation had any e¤ect on borrowersdefault
decisions. Our identication comes from both time di¤erences in the behavior of primary
single home purchase loans before and after the law change, and cross-sectional di¤er-
ences between primary single home renanced loans and primary single home purchase
loans.
The paper has three main results. First, we uncover evidence that lenders tighten
their lending standards by reducing approval rates and loan sizes for those a¤ected after
the implementation of the law. They do not, however, increase mortgage interest rates
signicantly. Second, we do not nd that mortgage applications for purchase loans for
one-to-four family owner-occupied homes increase signicantly after the implementation
of the law, nor does it increase more than applications for other loans for owner-occupied
homes. Finally, we do not nd that borrowersdefault behavior responds to the change in
Nevada law in any statistically signicant way. What is more, we do not nd any evidence
that the change in recourse law makes borrowersdefault behavior more sensitive to home
equity or house value. Our analysis thus casts a cautionary note on treating deciency
judgments as useful tools to curb mortgage defaults as they may lead to ex ante riskier
lending by lenders.
In addition to the researches cited above, our paper is also related to two other strands
of literature. The rst is the literature that studies the impact of various aspects of state
laws on lending cost. For example, Clauretie and Herzog (1990) and Ciochetti (1997)
document greater lender costs in states that require judicial foreclosure and statutory
right of redemption. Lin and White (2001) and Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) show
that bankruptcy exemptions do and do not a¤ect, respectively, whether a mortgage
application is approved. Pence (2006) nds that lenders approve smaller loans in default-
friendly states everything else the same. The second is the vast literature examining
various aspects of mortgage borrowersdecision to default. Among the recent studies,
Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007), Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008), and Demyanyk
and van Hemert (2011) focus on negative equity as an important condition for defaults
for mortgages originated in the state of Massachusetts. Bajari, Chu, and Park (2008),
Bajari, Chu,Nekipelov, and Park (20013), Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan (2010), Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2013), and Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt
(2011) study both negative home equity and illiquidity as two important drivers of the
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rise in mortgage defaults during the recent crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the law change in
Nevada and its potential impact on debtors and creditors. Section 3 presents our data
source. Section 4 reports our empirical analysis and section 5 concludes.
2 The Nevada Deciency Judgment Law and Its Im-
pact
2.1 The Nevada Deciency Judgment Law
The state of Nevada is a recourse state, it allows lenders to pursue deciency judgments
- the di¤erence between the balance owed on a mortgage loan and what the lender sells
the house for at auction - within six months of the auction. After the six months,
lenders are barred from ling a law suit to collect the judgments. Since the onset of the
mortgage crisis in 2007, Nevada, as with many other states, has begun to implement
new laws to mitigate foreclosures. In 2009, eight laws were passed in Nevada alone.4
Table 1 summarizes the eight laws. As can be seen, almost all laws made foreclosure more
cumbersome and costly by either imposing additional regulatory procedures or assigning
more rights to owners or renters during a foreclosure. The only exception is Bill AB 140,
which also increased owners/tenantsresponsibility to maintain the property during the
foreclosure sale.
This paper concerns one the most important new laws Assembly Bill No. 471.
This bill made signicant changes to Nevadas deciency judgment law. Under the new
legislation, a nancial institution holding a residential mortgage may not be awarded a
deciency judgment under the following circumstances: (1) the real property is a single-
family house owned by the debtor; (2) the debtor used the money loaned from the bank
to buy the house (as in a typical mortgage); (3) the house was owner-occupied; and (4)
the loan was never renanced. What this means is that, for many homeowners who enter
into a mortgage in conjunction with a purchase after October 1, 2009, their mortgage
lender will not be able to pursue a deciency judgment should the house be taken in a
foreclosure. Rather, upon foreclosure, the risk that the house has depreciated in value
shifts back to the bank. Mortgages that do not satisfy these conditions continue to be
4In total, 33 states enacted at least 99 new laws in 2009. These states include Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
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subject to the prior law.5
Nevada passed no other laws in 2010 for Nevada (the 26th Special Session). In the
summer of 2011, to combat robosigning, the Nevada legislature passed a set of pre-
foreclosure rules that essentially required the big banks to prove their chain of title
before the foreclosure can take place (AB 273, AB 284, AB 388, and SB 414). These
changes made judicial foreclosure process more attractive to the banks which allowed
them to sidestep the new robosigning law and to seek a deciency judgment at the same
time on properties not covered by AB 471.
2.2 The Impact of Deciency Judgments onMortgage Lending,
Borrowing, and Default
The impact of the deciency law on borrowersdefault behavior hinges crucially on the
borrowersnon-housing asset. If the borrower has other assets that can be collected after
house foreclosure, then the permission of a deciency judgment will deter the borrower
from becoming seriously delinquent. The more assets the borrower has, the stronger the
deterrence will be. Another important factor that a¤ects the impact of the deciency law
on borrowersdefault behavior is the cost of collecting deciency judgments. If the cost
is high, then the e¤ect will be small. Finally, in a dynamic setting, future local house
price movement, borrowers income, and the cost of defaulting (less access to future
credit) will all be factored into borrowersdecision. See Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) and
Corbae and Quintin (2010) for more discussion.
If lenders are not allowed to collect on debtorsother assets, they will be reluctant
to foreclose on a house, especially when foreclosure cost is high because there is no
nancial gain from doing so. Furthermore, if lenders perceive default probabilities to
rise as a result of the elimination of deciency judgments, they will tighten their lending
standards by lending to less riskier people, lending smaller amount of loans, or lending at
higher mortgage rates. Borrowers, on the other hand, may decide to apply for mortgages
or to apply for larger loans since they do not risk their other assets in the event of being
foreclosed.
Based on this theory, we seek to test several hypotheses. First, are lenders less
willing to lend, lend a smaller amount, or lend at higher rates to primary single family
5Aside from recourse, in Nevada, lenders may foreclose on mortgages in default using either a judicial
or non-judicial foreclosure process. The judicial process of foreclosure involves ling a lawsuit to obtain
a court order to seek foreclosure and is used when no power of sale is present in the mortgage. The
borrower has 12 months after the foreclosure sale to redeem the property. When a power of sale clause
exists in a mortgage or deed of trust, the non-judicial process is used. Borrowers have no right of
redemption under the power of sale.
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purchase mortgage loans after the implementatin of the law (October 1, 2009)? Second,
do borrowers apply for more and/or larger primary single family purchase mortgage
loans after October 2009? Finally, are primary single family mortgage loans made after
October 2009 more likely to become delinquent than primary single family loans made
earlier or primary single family renance loans? Are lenders less likely to foreclose on a
single-family property with loans originated after October 2009 than other loans?
3 Data and Empirical Methodologies
3.1 Data and Data Sampling
We use two main data sets. The rst is the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),
which covers almost all mortgage applications as well as originations in US. It records
each applicants nal status (denied/approved/originated), purpose of borrowing (home
purchase/renancing/home improvement), occupancy type (primary residence/second
or investment homes), loan amount, race, sex, income, as well as lender institution.6
We drop loans insured by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Veterans Admin-
istration (VA) because deciency judgments are prohibited on FHA loans and strongly
discouraged on VA loans. We also drop mortgage loans for manufacturing housing as in
Ghent and Kudlyak (2011).
The second, LPS Applied Analytics, Inc., provides information from homeowners
mortgage applications concerning their nancial situation, characteristics of the prop-
erty, terms of the mortgage contract, and information about securitization, plus updates
on whether homeowners paid in full or defaulted, whether lenders started foreclosure and
whether the home was sold in foreclosure. LPS covers some two-thirds of installment-
type loans in the residential mortgage servicing market for the post-2005 period that we
are analyzing. As with the HMDA data, we delete from the sample FHA and VA loans.
Both data are then merged with county level monthly unemployment rates obtained
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and monthly zip code level house price index avail-
able from CoreLogic. When zip code house price index is not available due to low
transaction volume for the calculation of repeated index, we substitute with county level
house price index and when county level house price index is not available either, we use
Nevada state house price index.
We use HMDA to examine lendersmortgage loan approval decision and mortgage
loan size decision and to detect changes in mortgage applications for a¤ected mortgages
6Only lenders who doe not do business in any metropolitan statistical area are not required report
(e.g., small community banks) to HMDA.
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after the implementation of the new deciency judgment law. As our benchmark, we
restrict the sample to rst lien mortgages made in Nevada for one-to-four family prop-
erties around October 2009 6 months before and after.7 We delete those applications
that are withdrawn without an approval decision or closed for incompleteness. We also
delete from the sample loans insured by Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Veter-
ans Administration (VA), and Farmers Home Administration (FmHa).
We use LPS to analyze lendersinterest rate decision conditional on mortgage loan
approval, borrowersdefault behavior, and lenders foreclosure decision. We focus on
rst lien mortgages for single family properties made in Nevada around October 2009
and follow the performance of these loans till the end of 2012. As with the HMDA data,
we delete from the sample loans insured by the government including FHA, VA, and
FmHa and loans with private mortgage insurance.
3.2 Empirical Methodologies
We use various regression techniques to study the impact of the deciency law change
in Nevada on lenders as well as borrowersbehavior. As mentioned earlier, mortgage
loan application approval and mortgage loan size decisions come from HMDA. For the
hypothesis regarding borrowersmortgage application decision which also uses HMDA
data, we aggregate the data to the zip code level and by purpose of the loan whether the
loan is for purchase or renance. We measure borrowersdefault behavior by becoming
for the rst time 60 days or more delinquent, and 90 days or more delinquent, as well as
lendersforeclosure decision as reported by LPS. Mortgage interest rates at origination
also come from LPS.
Our identication comes from the interaction of two terms, whether the loan is a
purchase loan for single family homes of primary residence and whether the loan is
made after October 1, 2009. Given rich information contained in the data, we will
conduct robustness analysis using other information such as primary versus investment
purchase loans as identication.
A generic regression in our analysis takes the following form,
(1) yit = Zit + Xit + "it;
where yit is the variable of interest, Zit is the key interaction variable discussed above,
and Xit is a vector of control variables. For the HMDA data, Xit includes the gender
of the applicant, race, income, whether the applicant has a cosigner for the mortgages,
whether the applicant comes from an area with 30 percent or more minorities, whether
7HMDA does not distinguish single family properties from two-to-four family properties.
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the lender is a commercial bank or its subsidiary, independent mortgage bank, thrift,
or credit union. When we aggregate the data to test for trend in mortgage application,
we can no longer control for any mortgage loan level or applicant level information.
Instead, Xit will include county unemployment rates and zip code house price growth
rates. For the LPS data, it includes borrowersFICO score at origination and mortgage
loan contract information such as mortgage loan age, loan-to-value ratio at origination,
whether the loan has full documentation, of xed interest rate, the level of the current
interest rate, and whether the loan is sold to private investors.8 For both data, we further
control for county and time (monthly) xed e¤ects and separate linear time trends for
each county. Finally, we cluster standard errors at the loan level for all the analysis
except mortgage demand .
We use ordinary least square regressions (OLS) when the dependent variable yit is
continuous and Probit regression when the dependent variable is binary. When testing
for mortgage loan size, we use Tobit analysis because the data are censored in the sense
that rejected loans e¤ectively have zero loan amount. Unfortunately, LPS does not
include any rejected loans, we thus use OLS for our interest rate analysis.
4 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis consists of three parts. First, we investigate how lenders respond
to the deciency law change in terms of mortgage loan approval rates, loan sizes, and
interest rates. Then we examine whether borrowers respond to the law change with
regard to loan applications. Finally, we study the relationship between the change in
deciency judgments and mortgage default and house foreclosure rates.
4.1 Mortgage Lending
We use three measures for the lending standard, mortgage approval rates, approved
mortgage loan sizes, and interest rates of approved mortgage loans. As discussed earlier,
we use HMDA data for the analysis on approval rates and mortgage loan sizes and LPS
data for the test on mortgage interest rates.
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the HMDA sample. For the six months before
and after October 1, 2009, there are in total 35,008 mortgages originated for one-to-four
8We observe virtually no subprime loans, and very few interest only and balloon mortgage loans
during our sample period.
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family primary residence with no government guarantee. Of the 35,008 applications, 69
percent are for renance. About 14 percent of the applications are a¤ected by the change
in deciency judgments. The overall mortgage approval rate is 72 percent. About 73
percent of the applications are led by male. Close to 80 percent of the applicants are
white and a little over 2 percent are black. Over half of the applications have cosigners
suggesting that these applicants are likely married. There exists signicant income
disparity among the applicants with the average (nominal) income at application at
$105,000 and the median income at $73,000. The average loan amount is $217,000 and
the median is $179,000. Less than 3 percent of the applicants live in areas with over
30 percent of the residents are minorities. The majority of the applications are led at
commercial banks (67 percent), followed by independent mortgage banks (19 percent),
thrifts (9 percent), and credit unions (5 percent). Unemployment rates are high in all
counties of Nevada with both mean and median at over 12 percent. House prices decline
for most of the state during that period.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the LPS sample. Between April 2009 and
March 2010, 13,478 mortgage loans are made for rst lien single family primary mort-
gages without government guarantees or private insurance. Note that this number is
smaller than the 24,850 approved mortgage loans calculated from HMDA. This is be-
cause we delete from LPS sample mortgages with private insurance and 2-to-4 family
mortgages while such information is not available in HMDA. LPS also has smaller data
coverage than HMDA.
Of the 13,478 mortgages, 48 percent are for renance. This number is substantially
lower than the 72 percent at application indicating that mortgage approval rates are
lower for renance mortgages during that period. About 4 percent of the mortgages
are a¤ected by the law change. The mean interest rate at origination is 4.98 percent
and the median is 4.87 percent. The majority of the mortgages are xed-rate mortgages
(over 97 percent). The mean credit score at origination is 715 and the median is 771.
About 41 percent of the mortgages have full documentation. A mere 2 percent are jumbo
mortgages, and 18 percent are sold to private investors. These statistics are consistent
with the observation of tight residential mortgage market at the time. Finally, the
unemployment rates are about 12.3 percent on average and almost all areas experience
house price declines.
4.1.2 Results
Approval and Loan Size. We chart the raw data for mortgage approval rates
and approved average mortgage loan sizes measured as deviations from their respective
October 2009 values in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 indicates that loan approval rates
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seem to be trending up for una¤ected renance loans while stayed more or less at for
a¤ected purchase loans. For approved mortgage sizes, the pattern is less clear.
We then conduct two analysis using HMDA. The rst is a Probit analysis where the
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the loan is approved and zero otherwise. The
second is a Tobit analysis where the dependent variable is the actual loan amount for
approved loans and zero for rejected loans. We report the regression results in Table 4.
The key variable, one-to-four family purchase loans made after October 2009, contributes
negatively and statistically signicantly to lendersapproval rate as well as mortgage loan
size upon approval decisions. In particular, a one-to-four family mortgage purchase loan
made after October 2009 has an approval rate that is 1.76 percentage points lower than
that of a similar loan made earlier or a single family renance loan, or 2.44 (1.76/72)
percent less likely to be approved and the loan size is $9,703, or 4.47 (9.7/217) percent
smaller after approval than loans not a¤ected.
In terms of the other control variables, for approval rates, everything else the same
a renance mortgage loan is about 15 percentage points less likely to be approved. This
result stems from the fact that loans made earlier during housing booms are of lower
standards and are thus less likely to be approved for renance once lenders tighten their
lending standards after the crisis. As expected, higher income increases the probability
of being approved while higher loan amount reduces the probability of being approved.
Specically, a $1,000 increase in income raises the approval rate by about 1 basis points
while a $1,000 increase in loan amount reduces the approval rate by about 3 basis points.
Living in minority areas substantially lowers the approval rates. Non-white, female,
or applicants with no cosigners have much lower mortgage approval rates. Lending
institutions also a¤ect loan approval rates. In particular, compared with specialized
mortgage banks, commercial banks and thrifts are less likely to approve mortgages while
credit unions are more likely to approve.
In terms of loan sizes of approved mortgages, renance loans are on average $54,000
smaller. Applicants with higher income borrow more with a $1,000 increase in income
corresponding to about $363 increase in loan size. Borrowers living in minority areas
get smaller loans, as do non-white, female, or applicants with no cosigners. Compared
with mortgage banks, commercial banks and thrifts approve smaller loans while credit
unions give out larger loans. Neither local unemployment rates nor house price growth
rates contribute signicantly to mortgage approval rates or loan sizes.
Interest Rate To further investigate whether lenders lend at higher interest rates
to borrowers a¤ected by the change in the deciency law, we run an ordinary least squares
regression (OLS) using LPS for loans made between April 2009 and March 2010. The
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results are reported in Table 5.
According to our analysis, interest rates on rst lien single family primary purchase
mortgage loans made after October 2009 are not statistically di¤erent from those made
after October 2009 or rst lien single family primary renance mortgage loans. This
could result from our earlier result that the approved rst lien single family purchase
loans are already of relatively higher quality and of relatively smaller sizes after October
2009.
For the other control variables, mortgage rates for renance loans are, on average,
about 11 basis points lower. An increase of 10 percentage points in mortgage loan-to-
value ratio raises the interest rate by about 3 basis points. An increase of 10 in FICO
score, on the other hand, reduces the interest rate by about 2 basis points. Loans sold to
private investors and loans with adjustable-rate mortgages all have lower interest rates
but jumbo mortgages have much higher interest rates. Finally, areas with high local
unemployment rates also face higher mortgage interest rates.
4.1.3 Robustness Analysis
Approval Rate and Mortgage Loan Size To test the robustness of our results
on mortgage loan approval rates and mortgage loan sizes, we conduct four additional
analysis. First, we extend our sample to include loans made between October 2008 and
September 2010, exactly one year before and one year after the deciency law change.
Second we use investment single property loans as well as primary single property re-
nance loans as control groups for the primary single property purchase loans that are
a¤ected by the law change. Third we use nonconventional primary single property pur-
chase loans as the control group. Finally, we conduct two placebo tests, one assuming
the law change occurred in April 2008 and the other assuming the law change occurred
in April 2011. Loans made half a year before the assumed change date and half a year
after are included. The results are reported in Table 6.
Extending the benchmark sample to include loans made one year before October 2009
and one year after strenghthens our results. Now the lenders are 5 percentage points more
likely to reject a single family purchase loan made after the law change and the loan size
is on average $36,000 smaller. Including renance loans and investment property loans
together still generate the signicant results that after October 1, 2009, lenders reduce
their approval rates of primary single family mortgage loans by 4.1 percentage points and
once approved, their loan sizes are $9,000 smaller than before. Using nonconventional
single family primary residence purchase loans as controls, the reduction in approval rates
and approved mortgage loans sizes become 2.4 percentage points and $5,000, respectively.
Tests using the two placebo dates generate very di¤erent results from the benchmark. For
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the April 2008 and the April 2011 date, the coe¢ cients are both statistically signicant
but have positive signs. Note that we chose the placebo test dates so that they su¢ ciently
removed from the policy date. All these experiments conrm that after the change in
the deciency judgement law, lenders tightened their lending standards in terms of loan
approval rates and loan sizes for a¤ected borrowers.
Mortgage Interest Rate For mortgage interest rates, we conduct four robustness
tests, extending the sample by including loans made one year before and one year after
the deciency law change, including investment properties, and including multifamily
properties, and use nonconventional purchase loans as controls, respectively. The results
are presented in Table 7. As can be seen, with the exception of the case of including
investor properties in the control group, the coe¢ cient of interest, single family purchase
loans made after October 2009 have statistically similar mortgage interest rates as other
loans in the control groups.
4.2 Mortgage Application
In this subsection, we investigate mortgage applicantsbehavior. Theory predicts that
those a¤ected by the change in the deciency law should postpone their application
for mortgages. Using the constructed HMDA sample, we calculate by month the total
number, total and average values of mortgages made for single family primary residence
purchase loans versus re loans made six months before and six months after October
2009. Figure 4 charts the demand in average loan sizes as deviations from its October
2009 level. As can be seen, compared with the average loan size of purchase mortgages,
there is a downward trend in average re loan sizes.
We then regress the number/amount on whether the loans are purchase or re loans,
lagged average local unemployment rates, lagged average local house price growth rates,
average local income, whether minority households are more than 30 percent of the
population, and separate time trends and their squares.9 The regression results are
reported in Table 8.
As can be seen, there does not exist a structural break for loan applications for
one-to-four primary mortgage loans after October 2009 in terms of total number of
mortgage applications, total dollar amount of mortgage applications, or average loan
sizes. Regarding other control variables, there appear to be more people applying for
renance loans than purchase loans, reecting the e¤ect of low mortgage interest rates
at the time. Over time, the demand for mortgages decline for total number of mortgage
9We can no longer have separate time dummies given the much smaller sample size.
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applications but not total mortgage loan amount or average mortgage size. Higher
average MSA(Metropolitian Statistical Area) income also increases average loan sizes at
application. County dummies are also important determinants of mortgage application.
Robustness Analysis We conduct three additional robustness tests, examining
loan applications made one year before and after October 2009, including investment
properties in the control group, and using nonconventional single family purchase loans
for primary residence as the control group. According to the results reported in Table
9, we do not detect any trend break for demand for single family primary mortgage
properties after October 2009.
4.3 Mortgage Default and House Foreclosure
This subsection seeks to test whether single family borrowers that borrowed after Octo-
ber 1, 2009 are more likely to default and whether lenders are less willing to foreclose
on these borrowers. We dene defaults to be the rst time that the loan becomes 60
days delinquent or 90 days delinquent, respectively. The foreclosure decision is dened
as entering foreclosure process.
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We use LPS for the default and foreclosure analysis. In particular,we focus on mortgage
loans originated six months before and six months after the change in the deciency
judgment law in October 2009 which spans April 2009 to March 2010. The control
group includes single family purchase loans made before October 2009 and single family
renance loans made during the whole sample period. We follow these mortgage loans
from the time of their origination to the rst time the loan becomes 60-day, 90-day
delinquent, enters into foreclosure, or reaches the end of the sample period December
2012.
Table 10 reports the summary statistics for 60+ delinquency sample. In total, we
have 352,534 observations. The monthly 60 day delinquency rate is 0.09 percent. About
63 percent of the loans are renance loans and 9 percent are purchase loans made after
October 1, 2009 and thus a¤ected by the deciency law change. The average loan age
is 21 months and the median is 24 months. The mean mortgage loan-to-value ratio is
68 percent with a median of 73 percent. The interest rate averages about 5 percent.
The average credit score (FICO) is 659 and median is 763, on the high end of the FICO
score range of 300 and 850. Slightly over half of the loans have full documents, a small
2 percent are jumbo loans, 3 percent are sold to private investors, and about 2 percent
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are of adjustable rates. The monthly unemployment rate averages 13 percent while the
monthly gross real house price growth rate averages about 1.0055 percent with large
variances. The sample statistics for the 90 days delinquency and foreclosure sample are
very similar except that the 90 day delinquency rate averages 0.04 percent monthly for
the 90+ day delinquency sample and the foreclosure rate is 0.02 percent monthly for
the foreclosure start sample. The three samples also have very similar sizes indicating
that many mortgages that have become 60 days delinquent have subsequently become
90 days or more delinquent and enter into foreclosure process.
Figure 4 charts the cumulative 60 days or more mortgage delinquency rates for
a¤ected mortgage loans and non-a¤ected mortgage loans over the sample period by
loan age. The two series track each other, but no one series appears to be dominating
the other. Note that the line depicting cumulative default rates for a¤ected mortgages
are choppier than that for the una¤ected ones because there are much fewer a¤ected
mortgages in total and in default.
4.3.2 Results
As discussed in the empirical methodologies, we run Probit regressions with the depen-
dent variable being the binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the loan becomes
delinquent or being foreclosed by the lender and 0 otherwise. We cluster standard errors
at the loan level. Table 11 reports our regression results including marginal e¤ects of
each explanatory variable and its associated standard error.
The variable of interest, single family mortgage loans made after October 2009, is
not statistically signicant in any of the three regressions. Renance loans are much
likely to default reecting lower lending standards when these loans were rst made as
purchase loans. The older the mortgage loan is, the more likely it becomes 60 days,
90 days delinquent or enters into foreclosure though the speed of the increase declines
with the age. As expected, mortgage loans with high mortgage loan-to-value ratios
at origination and loans with adjustable mortgage interests are more likely to become
delinquent or being foreclosed. Current interest rate also contributes positively to default
and foreclosure probabilities. Interestingly, having full document also increases mortgage
default probability. By contrast, having high FICO scores at origination reduces default
as well as foreclosure probability. County and time xed e¤ects are included in all three
regressions.
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4.3.3 Robustness Analysis
We extend the sample to include loans made one year before or after October 2009. The
results are reported in Table 12. As can be seen, the mortgage default rates are not
a¤ected by the law change. To test the hypothesis that the change of the deciency law
may have di¤erential e¤ect on borrowers with low home equity or high assets as theory
predicts. We conduct two additional analysis. In one of the analysis, we restrict our
sample to those with mortgage loan-to-value ratio to be above 90 percent.10 In the other
analysis, we focus on loans with house value that is above the median of all properties at
the time of origination. The key coe¢ cient of interest, single family mortgage loans made
after October 2009 as well as the interaction terms, remains statistically insignicant.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies whether the change in deciency judgments that a¤ected only pur-
chase mortgages made on single family primary residence after October 2009 in the state
of Nevada had a¤ected mortgage borrowersdefault behavior, lendersforeclosure and
lending decisions, as well as general householdsmortgage application behavior. In doing
so, the paper makes a contribution to several strands of literature that seek to under-
stand the relationship between real estate laws and borrower and lender behavior. In
contrast to some of the existing studies, the paper does not nd any signicant change in
a¤ected borrowersmortgage default and lendersforeclosure decisions. However, it does
nd strong evidence that lenders have tightened their lending standards substantially
both in terms of loan approval rate and loan size, though not on mortgage interest rates.
It further reveals that there were no delays in mortgage applications from households.
The paper thus casts a cautionary note on using deciency judgments as a deterrence
for mortgage default or mortgage foreclosure. Further policy analysis requires more
structural analysis which we pursue in a separate project.11
10We estimate the current house value by applying local house price growth rates to home value at
origination. Home equity is the di¤erence between the current house value and mortgage balance.
11See Consumer Bankruptcy and Mortgage Default by Wenli Li, Costas Meghir, and Florian
Oswald.
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Figure 1. Deviations in Loan Approval Rates for One-to-Four Family Primary
Residence Conventional Loans (deviations from 200910; Source: HMDA)
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Figure 2. Deviations in Approved Loan Sizes or One-to-Four Family Primary
Residence Conventional Loans ($000,deviations from 200910; Source: HMDA)
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Figure 3. Mortgage Loan Applications for One-to-Four Family Primary Residence
Conventional Loans ($000, deviations from 200910; Source: HMDA)
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Figure 4. Cumulative 60 Days Or More Delinquency Rates for Loans Made Six Months
Before and After october 2009 (A¤ected loans include single family purchase loans for
primary residence made after October 2009; not a¤ected loans include single family
purchase loans for primary residence before October 29 and single family re loans for
primary residence. Source: LPS Applied Analytics.)
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Table 1. Major Nevada Foreclosure Laws Enacted in 2009
Bill # Signed E¤ective Summary
AB 486 05/26 10/01 Adds a provision to the escrow law that an escrow agent
or escrow agency may be required to pay restitution to a
person who su¤ered an economic loss due to a violation of
NRS or NAC 645A.
AB 471 05/28 10/01 Provided that a deciency in a payment on a mortgage,
deed of trust or other encumbrance may be cured under
certain circumstance before foreclosure. Providing that a
court shall not award a deciency judgment on the foreclosure
of a mortgage or deed of trust under certain circumstance.
AB 361 05/28 10/01 Provides that, under certain circumstances, a unit-owners
association may enter the grounds of a vacant unit or a unit in
foreclosure to abate a public nuisance or maintain the exterior
of the unit.
SB 128 05/28 07/01 Species certain reporting requirements during a foreclosure
proceeding, and imposes a time frame of 30 days for
reporting a foreclosure sale to the county.
AB 149 05/29 07/01 Modies existing foreclosure law and establishes a state
Foreclosure Mediation Program. Foreclosure proceedings
will be halted while borrowers pursuing mediation.
AB 151 05/29 10/01 Requires mortgage loans to include the license number of the
mortgage broker.
AB 152 05/29 07/01 Modies denitions and established requirements for loan
modication consultants,such as licensing and certain fees
for services relating to foreclosure.
AB 140 06/09 07/01 & Establishes the rights and responsibilities of property owners
10/01 and tenants during a foreclosure sale, including property
maintenance. Imposes a $1000 le per day for failing
to maintain the property.
Note. For AB 140, Sections 10 and 11 ( ensure that social security numbers are redacted from the copy
of the promisary note) became e¤ective on July 1, 2009. Sections 1 to 9 inclusive became e¤ective on
October 1, 2009. Source: https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/75th2009/Bills/AB/AB140_EN.pdf.
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Table 2. Sample Summary Statistics HMDA
variable mean median standard deviation
approval rate 0.7117 1 0.4529
renanced mortgage loans 0.6860 1 0.4641
loans a¤ected by law changes 0.1409 0 0.2831
female 0.2747 0 0.4463
gender unknown 0.0671 0 0.2502
race: black 0.0227 0 0.1490
race: non-white and non-black 0.00908 0 0.2873
race: unknown 0.1127 0 0.3162
no cosigner 0.4707 0 0.4991
income ($ thousands) 105 73 191
loan amount ($ thousands) 217 179 198
living in area with 30% or more minorities 0.0257 0 0.1581
lender: commercial bank and their subsidiaries 0.6667 1 0.4714
lender: independent mortgage banks 0.1911 0 0.3932
lender: thrifts 0.0860 0 0.2804
lender: credit unions 0.0542 0 0.2264
lagged local unemployment rate (%) 12.0379 12.1000 1.5494
lagged net local house price growth rate -0.0032 -0.0027 0.0183
Total number of observations 35,008
Note. Mortgage loans for owner-occupied primary housing originated between April 2009 and
April 2010.  indicates dummy variables.
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Table 3. Sample Summary Statistics LPS
variable mean median standard deviation
renance mortgage loans 0.4780 0 0.4995
loans a¤ected by the law change 0.0378 0 0.1906
current interest rate 4.9765 4.8750 0.4532
mortgage loan-to-value ratio at origination 66.1604 70.3500 22.4217
FICO at origination 715 771 185
full document 0.4059 0 0.4910
jumbo loan 0.0198 0 0.1392
loan sold to private investor 0.1844 0 0.3878
adjustable-rate mortgage 0.0179 0 0.1328
lagged local unemployment rate 12.2901 12.6000 1.7665
lagged gross local real house price growth rate -0.0015 -0.0076 0.1174
Total number of mortgage loans 13,478
Note. Purchase or renance loans for owner-occupied single family housing originated between
April 2009 and April 2010. These loans are not government guaranteed.  indicates dummy
variables.
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Table 4. Mortgage Lending: Approval Rates and Loan Size Benchmark (HMDA)
Mortgage Approval Mortgage loan size (Tobit)
(Probit, Marginal E¤ect)
variable marginal e¤s s.e. coe¢ cient s.e.
purchase loans made after reform -0.0176 0.0718 -9.7027 1.7957
renance loan -0.1480 0.0041 -54.2885 3.4139
income at origination ($ thousands) 1.34e-04 2.34e-05 0.3633 0.0161
loan amount ($ thousands) -2.52e-04 2.45e-05
MSA with over 30% minorities -0.2468 0.0046 -131.8096 3.3272
being black -0.1181 0.0063 -47.1998 2.5399
being non-white and non-black -0.0607 0.0044 -23.6160 1.3324
race unknown -0.0903 0.0022 -28.8026 2.8364
female -0.0168 0.0081 -17.7182 3.6263
gender unknown 0.0321 0.0075 25.3257 4.6304
no cosigner -0.0591 0.0023 -36.1738 1.9821
lender: commercial bank -0.0868 0.0074 -23.4369 2.3646
lender: thrift -0.0115 0.0109 -8.9440 2.6794
lender: credit union 0.0749 0.0110 3.3887 2.4575
lagged monthly unemployment rate 0.0297 0.0578 5.4625 3.3684
lagged hpi growth rate 0.0472 0.2269 66.3319 110.8624
linear county time trends yes yes
county xed e¤ects yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.0563 0.0151
number of observations 35,008 35,008
Note. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at
1 percent level.
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Table 5. Mortgage Lending: Interest Rate Benchmark (LPS)
interest rate at origination
variable coe¢ cient s.e.
purchase loan made after reform -0.0263 0.0264
renance loan -0.1053 0.0100
loan-to-value ratio at origination 0.0025 0.0002
FICO score at origination -0.0018 0.0001
full document 0.0126 0.0104
private investor -0.0600 0.0135
jumbo mortgage 0.4269 0.0645
adjustable rate mortgage -0.7500 0.0387
lagged monthly unemployment rate 0.0466 0.0150
lagged real hpi growth rate 0.0306 0.0344
linear county time trend yes
county xed e¤ects yes
time xed e¤ects yes
R-squared 0.1858
number of observations 13,478
Note. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level,
** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level.
Table 6. Mortgage Lending: Approval Rates and Loan Size Robustness Analysis (HMDA)
loan approval rate loan size ($)
coe¢ cient s.d. coe¢ cient s.d.
loans originated: 200810 201009 -0.0530 0.0092 -35.7594 4.0883
include investment loans -0.0414 0.0059 -8.8168 1.7057
conventional vs nonconventional purchase loans -0.0238 0.0046 -4.6432 1.7388
placebo law change date: April 2008 0.0441 0.0086 24.4289 4.8536
placebo law change date: April 2011 0.0709 0.0099 26.0907 5.5897
Note. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1
percent level.
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Table 7. Mortgage Lending: Interest Rate Robustness Analysis (Static LPS)
Sample mortgage rate (%)
coe¢ cient s.d.
loans originated: 200810 - 201009 -0.0091 0.0217
include investment properties -0.1204 0.0192
include multifamily properties -0.0097 0.0184
conventional vs nonconventional purchase loans -0.0236 0.0168
Note. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level,
and *** at 1 percent level.
Table 8. Mortgage Applications Benchmark (HMDA)
# loan applications loan amount ($1000) Average loan size
variable coe¢ cient s.e. coe¢ cient s.e. coe¢ cient s.e.
purchase loans made after reform 35.9650 22.2631 9038.04 5499.25 0.5473 6.5978
renance loans 101.44 16.70 25394 4125.15 18.3825 4.9492
average income of the MSA -0.1628 0.2918 -30.5580 72.0755 1.0608 0.0865
MSA with over 30% minorities -453.12 530.82 -137326.8 131118.7 116.15 157.31
lagged unemployment rate -12.7225 9.6513 -3100.375 2383.972 -5.6564 2.8601
lagged house price growth rate -45.5819 127.337 -9200.426 31453.61 3.6573 37.737
time trend -69.86 41.23 -15942.68 10183.51 -4.3822 12.218
time trend squared 0.9478 0.6239 215.5841 154.11 0.0657 0.1849
county dummies included yes yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.8363 0.8115 0.7103
number of observations 325 325 325
Note. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent
level.
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Table 9. Mortgage Applications Robustness Analysis (HMDA)
# loan applications loan amount ($1000) Average loan size
sample coe¢ cient s.e. coe¢ cient s.e. coe¢ cient s.e.
loan application: 200810 201009 7.0772 14.7954 2125.01 3614.89 2.6299 5.1689
include investment properties 16.6061 23.6911 4372.19 5715.32 -0.0193 8.4571
conventional vs nonconventional -11.0204 42.7198 -1291.89 6380.23 -2.2505 5.6399
purchase loans
Note. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent
level.
Table 10. Sample Summary Statistics (Dynamic LPS)
variable mean median standard deviation
60 days mortgage delinquency sample
60 day mortgage delinquency rate 0.00085 0 0.0292
remortgage 0.6343 1 0.4816
loans a¤ected by the law change 0.0864 0 0.2809
age of the loan (months) 20.8970 24 11.6881
mortgage loan-to-value ratio at origination 67.8118 72.5500 17.9809
current interest rate 4.9599 4.8750 0.4639
FICO at origination 659 763 262
full document 0.5254 1 0.4994
jumbo loan 0.0193 0 0.1373
loan sold to private investor 0.0294 0 0.1688
adjustable-rate mortgage 0.0168 0 0.1283
lagged local unemployment rate 12.8817 13.1000 1.7947
lagged local house price growth rate 0.0049 -0.0044 0.1386
Total number of observations 352,534
Note. Purchase loans for owner-occupied housing originated between April 2009 and March
2010 excluding October 2009 and followed until the loan rst becomes 60 days delinquent or
the end of the sample period, December 2012. These loans are not government guaranteed
and with no private mortgage insurance. indicates dummy variables.
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Table 11. Mortgage Default and Foreclosure Start Benchmark
(loans originated between 200904 to 201004)
60 days delinquent 90 days delinquent Foreclosure start
variable marginal e¤s s.e. marginal e¤s s.e. marginal e¤s s.e.
purchase loans made 4.64e-05 1.15-04 6.14e-05 1.44-04 2.45e-05 7.29e-05
after reform
re loans 2.35e-04 4.67e-05 3.12e-04 5.77e-05 1.24e-04 2.69e-05
loan age (months) 7.45e-05 1.66e-05 6.35e-05 1.89e-05 3.09e-05 6.23e-06
loan age squared -1.14e-06 3.00e-07 -8.49e-07 3.40e-07 -4.65e-07 1.24e-07
ltv ratio at orig. 1.17e-05 1.37e-06 1.58e-05 1.72e-06 6.34e-06 9.46e-07
FICO score at -3.96e-06 4.70e-07 -3.57e-06 5.20e-07 -1.07e-06 2.49e-07
origination
current interest rate 1.94e-04 4.04e-05 2.38e-04 4.84e-05 7.71e-05 2.24e-05
full document 1.23e-04 4.67e-05 1.44e-04 5.62e-05 3.60e-05 2.36e-05
private investor 4.21e-05 1.20e-04 -1.11e-04 8.79e-05 -4.07e-05 3.75e-05
jumbo mortgage -2.29e-04 6.40e-05
adjustable rate mortgage 5.47e-04 3.60e-04 8.34e-04 5.00e-04 5.28e-04 3.08e-04
lagged mon. unemp. rate -4.48e-06 3.12e-05 2.77e-05 3.09e-05 2.96e-05 1.04e-05
lagged hpi growth rate -4.78e-05 1.27e-04 7.39e-05 1.56e-04 1.07e-05 7.27e-05
county xed e¤ects yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes
county time trends yes yes yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.1004 0.1118 0.1290
number of observations 352,534 353,837 354,793
Note. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent
level. Dummies for interest only and balloon loans predict 90 days delinquency perfectly and are not
included in the regression. The dummy for jumbo loans predicts foreclosure probability perfectly and
are not included in the 90 days delinquency and the foreclosure regressions.
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Table 12. Mortgage Default and Foreclosure Start - Robustness Analysis
60 days delinquent 90 days delinquent Foreclosure start
sample marginal e¤s s.e. marginal e¤s s.e. marginal e¤s s.e.
originated: 200810-201009 6.54-e05 1.50e-04 -2.14e-06 8.56e-05 -1.88e-06 3.10e-05
mortgage ltv above 90 2.53e-04 4.54e-04 -1.30e-04 6.76e-05 5.00e-05 3.30e-04
above median house value 4.59e-04 4.56e-04 1.66e-04 3.07e-04 1.43e-05 4.81e-05
Note. * indicates statistical signicance at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent
level.
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